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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
CONSTITUTIONAL VALIDITY OF ZONING UNDER
THE POLICE POWER.
By EUGENE MCQUILLIN.*
1. Questions outlined.
Concerning the constitutional validity of zoning laws and regula-
tions thereunder, apart from those authorizing the employment of the
delegated power of eminent domain, the fundamental question is the
extent Public Authority may go in restricting the use of private prop-
erty under the police power in order to safeguard the public welfare
even in its most comprehensive sense. Zoning laws are to be tested by
development and developing principles relating to the legitimate exer-
cise of the police power. Speaking generally the questions in all such
cases are first, whether the ordinances emanate from ample grant of
power by the state to the city or town; second, whether they have any
reasonable tendency to promote the public safety, health or morals, and
recent cases rightly include the public comfort, welfare and prosperity,
and third, whether the power in the given case has been reasonably
exercised with due regard to property rights.
Specifically one question is: May the police power be exercised by
so-called zoning, comprehensive or limited, so as to exclude from des-
ignated districts or zones lawful occupations and businesses and build-
ings and structures which are not intrinsically obnoxious or likely to
become obnoxious by the manner in which they are conducted or used,
and place them in designated districts or zones? This, of course, is
apart from the need of safeguarding the public health, safety, morals
or the indefinite term, general welfare. The other question is: May
the police power be exercised for the above purpose to impose use
regulations on real estate and buildings?
In the first place it should be said that many of the basic legal
tests to determine the constitutional validity of such laws have been
reasonably well settled. But apart from the applicable underlying prin-
ciples it should be remembered that each case must be determined on
its own facts as they appear in the record before the court. Assuming
ample grant of power to enact a regulation, to be valid it must be clear
from such record, first, that the purpose of the regulation is fairly
within the range of the police power; second, that it is being carried
out, respecting the property involved, in a reasonable manner; and
*Formerly of Missouri Public Service Commission; author of McQuillin
on Municipal Corporations.
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third, that it is uniform, free from unreasonable discrimination. The
points usually urged are that regulations, restrictions or prohibitions
on the use of property (1) constitute an unreasonable interference with
rights of property, or (2) deprive property owners of "due process
of law" or the "equal protection of the laws."
These restrictions may be considered from three points of view.
(1) Their effect on the land owner, (2) their effect, if any, on those
to be benefited by the regulation, as those owning property on resi-
dential streets or in residential districts, and (3) their effect on the
public.
2. Federal constitution as test.
In investigating the constitutional validity of zoning laws, in view
of the provisions of the United States Constitution, it should be said
at the threshold that it is not important whether the power to enact
them emanates from the state constitution, or state statutes, or the
municipal charter, because the state cannot violate the United States
Constitution by its own constitution, hence, it cannot by its constitution
repeal, modify or suspend the due process of law clauses or the guaran-
tees of. personal and property rights contained in the fifth and four-
teenth amendments.'
Therefore the determination by the people of a state in their
constitution as to what constitutes proper exercise of the police power
or the power of eminent domain in zoning regulations is not final or
conclusive, but in view of the Federal Constitution it is subject to
supervision by the Supreme Court of the United States. This funda-
mental principle of our system was emphasized recently by the highest
court of Massachusetts in testing the constitutionality of a statute
authorized by a late amendment of the constitution of that state con-
ferring upon the state legislature express "power to limit buildings
according to their use or construction to specified districts of cities and
towns." This court pertinently observed that, since "the Constitution
of the United States, within the sphere covered by it, is supreme over
all the people and over each act of every instrumentality of government
established within or by the several states, the constitution of a state
stands no higher or stronger in this particular than any other act of
the state."'
1. Guinn v. United States, 235 U. S. 347; Scott v. McNeal, 154 U. S. 34,
45; New Orleans Water Works Company v. Rivers, 115 U. S. 674, 681; Fisk
v. Jefferson Police Jury, 116 U. S. 131.
2. Opinion of the Justices, 234 Mass. 596.
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3. Municipal power to zone.
Under our form of government the police power belongs exclu-
sively to sovereignty and inheres in the state without reservation in
the constitution, and may be given expression directly by the people in
their organic law, or by the initiative in legislation, or indirectly by
their state legislature, which latter is the customary method. Thus
within the concept of the term "police power" is usually meant a power
of sovereignty inherent in the state without reservation. What par-
ticular police powers, therefore, any given city or town may exercise
and the manner of the exercise thereof will depend upon the language
of the grants, and their reasonable construction in accordance with the
policy of the particular state, as shown by its organic and statutory
provisions and its judicial decisions relating to the subject. All such
powers, of course, must be exercised not only consistent with the state
constitution and laws, but also within the orbit of the Constitution,
treaties and laws of the nation. This is merely to say that a city or
town can legislate or exercise powers only on matters authorized. It
has no inherent power to enact police regulations. 3
Hence, before a city can proceed with a comprehensive zoning plan
it is indispensable that it should have the necessary power in its char-
ter, whether constitutional or legislative, or in the state constitution
or legislative act applicable to the particular city. The city may have
under its police power ample authority to regulate the height, size or
bulk, material and method of construction, and use of buildings relat-
ing to safety and health and to prevent such property from becoming
offensive or public nuisances, and also ample power to make other
reasonable restrictions and regulations in the interest of the public
safety, health, morals and welfare. But such power alone is not suf-
ficient to enable the authorities of the city to proceed with an exten-
sive zoning plan. Piecemeal zoning might be of some advantage, but
such attempts would fall far short of the requirements of most urban
centers. To proceed with a broad zoning plan the city should be
empowered to impose different regulations for buildings and structures
and for the uses of land and buildings and structures in different dis-
tricts. Under the usual police power possessed by cities such classi-
fication is not authorized.
4. Exclusive residential districts.
In order to establish 'an exclusive residence district, among others,
these regulations, restrictions or prohibitions are important:
3. Clements v. McCabe, 210 Mich. 207, 216; Marion v. Criolo, 278 Ill.
159; United States Fuel & Gas Co. v. Commonwealth, 159 Ky. 34.
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1. Excluding all kinds of business therefrom.
2. Establishing a building line uniform on certain streets.
3. Conforming new buildings (and those reconstructed, altered
or extensively repaired) substantially, or as near as practicable in class
or character, to those already erected in the locality.
4. Prescribing distances buildings are to be from each other.
5. Excluding heavy traffic from certain streets.
Courts uniformly hold that unreasonable restraints on the right to
use and enjoy property canot be imposed, nor can they be imposed
for the benefit of adjacent or neighboring property, 4 nor, it has been
held in West Virginia, to effect symmetry of the city streets or sec-
tions, otherwise than under the power of eminent domain allowing com-
pensation, if at all.5
Excluding substantially all business from exclusive residential
districts is perhaps one of the most important features of city plan-
ning and zoning in its broad aspect. However, under the police power
so far developed in principle and application, it is probable that its
lawful exercise will not permit the exclusion of all business from such
districts, unless it is made to appear that the business sought to be
excluded is in fact a nuisance or detrimental to the welfare of the dis-
trict or likely to become so by reason of the manner in which it is con-
lucted or by reason of the conditions surrounding the conduct of the
business.
Among the reasons for excluding all bilsiness from a residential
district the following may be mentioned:
1. It would insure better police protection. Business places afford
an excuse for criminals and the evil disposed to go into the neighbor-
hood unobserved, where without this pretense it might be that this class
would be scrutinized with more care. The gathering of idlers and
loiterers in and about shops and business establishments, moreover,
require additional police protection.
2. The risk of fire is greater in a business than in a residence
district.
3. It is sometimes suggested that less expensive street pavement
is needed in the residence district than in a business section where
heavy hauling is required, and thus economy in this matter may be
advanced.
4. Business places may become decidedly detrimental or even
nuisances. Some are more or less noisy, some unsightly, some mal-
4. Eubank v. Richmond, 223 U. S. 137.
5. State v. Stahlman, 81 W. Va. 335.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol11/iss2/2
ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
odorous and some may bring rats, flies and other objectionable vermin
into the neighborhood.
5. Property in a restricted residence district always commands a
better price for residence purposes than in neighborhoods unrestricted.
At present it is no longer seriously questioned that all things det-
rimental to public safety, health, morals and welfare (confined within
reasonable limits) may be excluded, but the law is not so clear as to
innocuous occupations.'
All business is not necessarily unlawful carried on at a particular
location because forbidden by law. A mere prohibition by ordinance
cannot make that unlawful which is not unlawful per se.7
So a mere declaration in a statute or ordinance that it is enacted
to protect public safety, health, morals or public welfare will not render
such law valid as being within the police power unless there is some
reasonable relation between such purpose and the regulation pre-
scribed.8 But as the application of the police power has been extended
in the past decade, and is now freely exercised and everywhere sus-
tained by the courts, it may be said that the only limitation on the
power of the city pursuant to reasonable regulation to declare that, in
particular circumstances and in particular localities within the municipal
area, a necessary and lawful occupation though not a nuisance in
itself shall be deemed a nuisance in law and fact, is that the power
cannot be exerted arbitrarily or with unjust discrimination. However,
in all cases where the exercise of the police power affects the free use
and enjoyment of property courts agree that it should be closely
scrutinized. 9
By virtue of sufficient grant of power the courts of last resort
have ruled that a city may, by ordinance, create a residence district in
a particular locality and exclude therefrom industrial plants, as a
foundry,10 a four-famliy flat building,"' a grocery store,1 2 a business
6. Adams v. Tanner, 244 U. S. 590.
7. Yates v. Milwaukee, 10 Wall. (U. S.) 497; St. Louis v. Dreisoerner,
243 Mo. 218, 223; St. Louis Gunning Co. v. St. Louis, 235 Mo. 147.8. Youngstown v. Kahn Bros. Bldg. Co. (Ohio), 148 N. E. 842, 843.
9. Palmberg v. Kinney, 65 Ore. 220; People v. Chicago, 260 Ill. 150.
10. Salt Lake City v. Western Foundry Stove Repair Works, 55 Utah447, invoking the doctrine of Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U. S. 394, which
sustained the exclusion of a brick yard from a described portion of a city.
11. State ex rel. Seery v. Houghton (Minn.) 204 N. W. 56. Contra,
State v. Minneapolis, 136 Minn. 479, 162 N. W. 477.12. State v. New Orleans, 154 La. 271, 97 So. Rep. 445, 33 A. L. R. 260;
Aurora v. Burns, Ill. Sup. Ct., Dec. 16, 1925.
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building,13 an automobile gasoline and oil filling station, but the latter
was denied in Texas.13 However, without special grant of power
attempts to exclude all business from certain streets or districts have
generally been regarded by the courts as an unwarranted invasion of
property rights.1"
In Minnesota it was first held that a four-family flat building could
not be excluded. 7 But lately under grant of broad power to zone this
court held the reverse.' And the Minnesota court held that the erec-
tion of a three-story brick apartment building in a residential district
could not be prevented under general police power,1 9 nor could a build-
ing suitable for a small factory. 2 However, under special power to
zone, in view of the latest ruling in this state, these decisions would
not be followed by its courts.
Ordinances, unsupported by grant of power to seggregate or zone,
prohibiting store buildings to be erected in main residential sections
have been condemned as void .2  Nor in Texas can warehouses be ex-
cluded from residential districts where it does not appear that they
are detrimental or in fact constitute a nuisance.2 The Colorado courts
said that a store building is in no sense a menace to the health, comfort,
safety or general welfare of the public,2 3 and the Illinois court re-
marked that there is nothing inherently dangerous to the health or
safety of the public in conducting a retail store.24 But lately the latter
court sustained a comprehensive zoning ordinance, authorized by stat-
ute, which excluded from an established residential district a grocery
store. 5
13. Ware v. Wichita, 113 Kan. 153, 214 Pac. Rep. 99.
14. Des Moines v. Manhattan Oil Company, 193 Iowa 1096, 184 N. W.
823; Liberty Oil Co. v. New Orleans (La.), 97 So. 446; Contra, Marshall v.
Dallas (Tex. Civ. App.), 253 S. W. 887, following Spann v. Dallas, 111 Tex.
350.
Without special grant of power automobile battery station may not be
excluded. Clements v. McCabe, 210 Mich. 207.
15. Marshall v. Dallas (Tex. Civ. App., 1923), 253 S. W. 887, following
Spann v. Dallas, lll Tex. 350.
16. People v. Roberts, 153 N. Y. Supp. 143 155 N. Y. 1333; St. Louis v.
Dorr, 145 Mo. 466.
17. State v. Minneapolis, 136 Minn. 479.
18. State v. Houghton (Minn., - July 3, 1925), 204 N. W. 569.
19. Vorlander v. Heganson, 145 Minn. 484.
20. Meyers v. Houghton, 137 Minn. 481.
21. St. Louis v. Dorr, 145 Mo. 466; State v. New Orleans, 142 La. 73;
Calvo v. New Orleans, 136 La. 448; Spann v. Dallas, 111 Tex. 350; Dallas
v. Burns (Tex. Ct. of App., 1923), 250 S. W. 717.
22. Hill v. Storie (Tex. Civ. App.), 236 S. W. 234.
23. Willison v. Cooke, 54 Colo. 323.
24. People v. Chicago, 261 Ill. 16, 103 N. E. 609, 49 L. R. A. (N. S.) 438,
Ann. Cas. 1915A, 292.
25. Aurora v. Burns, Ill. Sup. Ct., Dec. 16, 1925.
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An ordinance cannot limit, in the opinion of the highest court of
New York, the right to erect and occupy buildings for a lawful pur-
pose, as "buying, selling, dealing in and otherwise disposing of vehicles,
automobiles, motorcycles, and other personal property.
20
The highest court of Maryland has declared that an automobile
salesroom cannot be excluded from a restricted residence district .
2
In New Jersey ordinances restricting a residence zone to the
erection of dwellings to be occupied by one family only have been held
unreasonable."
An ordinance of Louisville districting and restricting residential
blocks so that the white and negro races should be seggregated was
held by the United States Supreme Court to be in violation of the four-
teenth amendment.29 And this in face of the fact, as mentioned by
Judge Westenhaver, that "the blighting of property values and the
congesting of population wherever the colored or foreign races invade
a residential section, are so well known as to be within judicial
cognizance."2 0 An undertaking establishment, it has been held in Min-
nesota, may be excluded from a residential district by statute.,1
Under a comprehensive ordinance duly authorized by law it has
been held legal to forbid the use of buildings for any other purpose
than dwellings, tenements, hotels and similar uses, and consequently
a one-story business building may be excluded, 3 2 and also a store
building.3
5. Status of ownership of property andt uses thereof.
In this country the court is the arbiter between the Public Author-
ity and the property owner. It is not so in European states. In Eng-
land, France, Germany, Belgium and in others an act of the supreme
legislative body is authoritative; it is law ipso facto when duly passed.
Of course, this accounts for the exercise in these countries of broader
powers by administrative authorities in planning and zoning, and in-
deed, in all municipal regulations affecting private property. Many
think the same rule should prevail here, but they overlook our con-
stitutions, and as a consequence in planning and zoning frequently
26. People v. Strobel, 209 N. Y. 434.
27. Stubbs v. Scott, 127 Md. 86.
28. Nelson Building Company v. Binda (N. J. Sup. Ct., 1925), 128 Atd.
218; Losick v. Binda (N. J. Sup. Ct., 1925), 128 Atl. 619.
29. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U. S. 60, 38 Sup. Ct. 16, 62 L. Ed. 149, L. R.
A. 1918C, 210 Ann. Cas. 1919A, 1201.
30. Ambler Realty Company v. Euclid, 295 Fed. 307, 313.
31. St. Paul v. Kesler, 146 Minn. 124.
32. Zahn v. Board of Appeals (Cal.), 234 Pac. 388.
33. Holzbetter v. Ritter, 184 Wis. 35, 198 N. W. 852.
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untenable and even extreme positions are sometimes taken. Many fail
to recognize the necessity of the protection of personal and property
rights. The concept of property embraces of course not only owner-
ship, but as well unrestricted right of use, enjoyment and disposal.
Thus it follows that government powers are not absolute but always
restricted to their true purpose.
The courts uniformly reject the view so often urged by some
7oning authorities, that "so long as the owner remains clothed with the
legal title thereto and is not ousted from the physical possession thereof,
his property is not taken, no matter to what extent his right to use it
is invaded or destroyed or its present or prospective value is depre-
ciated. ' '34 But as said by the United States Supreme Court, "There
can be no conception of property aside from its control and use."
"Property is more than the mere thing which a person owns. It is
elemental that it includes the right to acquire, use and dispose of it.
The Constitution protects the essential attributes of property. Property
consists of the free use, enjoyment and disposal of a person's acquisi-
tions without control or diminution save by the law of the land."3 5
Some seem to think that the guaranty of equality in the United
States Constitution is unfortunate, since it requires the law to prevail
rather than the will of the individual. Some would have the city plan-
ners and zoners, directing the public authorities, a law unto them-
selves. As such despotic power cannot be asumed by the individual
in either his personal relations or in his property rights, so it cannot
be assumed by Public Authority. Our written constitutions, federal
and state, settle that. Public as well as private authority is restricted.
The limitation on Public Authority fixed in organic law, we know, is
America's distinct political contribution to the world. Because the law
demands "reason" for imposing different restrictions in different parts
of the municipal area and exacts that all property in the same situation
be treated alike, it does not allow public officers to do as they please.
Vested and property rights continue to be protected by the courts. At
present, it is true, a somewhat different opinion prevails than that
heretofore existing. There is a growing purpose to restrict the uses of
property for the welfare of the community. It is a phase merely of
the ascendency of the principle of Collectivism, or rather public or
community interest, over Individualism; and moreover, restrictions
on the use of property and property rights appear in all the humani-
34. Ambler Realty Co. v. Euclid, 297 Fed. 307, 313.
35. Buchanan v. Warley. 245 U. S. 74, 38 Sup. Ct. 16, 62 L. Ed. 149, L. R.
A. 1918C, 210, Ann. Cas. 1918A, 1201.
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tarian regulations, products of the past decades, as limiting hours of
labor, especially of women and children, requiring proper sanitation,
safe methods to protect employees, forbidding the crowding of humans
into flats, tenements and factories and like limitations and prohibitions.
Therefore, it must be remembered, as the courts point out, that the leg-
islation authorizing so-called zoning ordinances is of comparatively
recent origin, and it is not unnatural that those adversely affected
should regard them as an unjust and unwarranted interference with
their property rights.
6. Effect of regulation on the property owner.
Regulation, restriction or prohibition relating to the use of real
property based upon the police power, to quote the words of the Su-
preme Court, "must have some fair tendency to accomplish, or aid in
the accomplishment of some purpose for which the legislature may use
the power. If the statutes are not of that kind, then their passage
cannot be justified under that power. . . If the means employed,
pursuant to the statute, have no real substantial relation to a public
object which government can accomplish; if the statutes are arbitrary
and unreasonable and beyond the necessities of the case, the court will
declare their invalidity." '
Again, if the property itself sought to be regulated, or the use
thereof, is not a public nuisance, or likely to become such, or is in no
way detrimental to individuals and their personal rights, or other prop-
erty and rights therein, or public safety, health, morals or welfare, or
likely to become so, restriction or prohibition imposed thereon concern-
ing location or use will not be sustained by the courts. The constitu-
tionality of any zoning plan, like that of any police regulation, to quote
again the emphatic language of the Supreme Judicial Authority, "must
depend upon the circumstances of each case and the character of the
regulation, whether arbitrary or reasonable, and whether really de-
signed to accomplish a legitimate public purpose." And on the other
hand, this tribunal has also said, with equal emphasis, the police pow-
ers knows no limitations "when not exerted arbitrarily," and that "a
vested interest cannot be asserted against it on account of conditions
once obtaining,"37 because so to hold "would preclude development and
fix a city forever in its primitive condition. There must be progress,
and if in its march private interests are in the way they must yield to
the good of the community." 38
36. Welch v. Swasey, 214 U. S. 91, 105.
37. Chicago & Alton R. Co. v. Tranbarger, 238 U. S. 67, 78.
38. Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U. S. 394, 410.
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7. Public protection, fire limits, height and building lines.
"Zoning necessarily involves a consideration of the community
as a whole and a comprehensive view of its needs. An arbitrary crea-
tion of districts, without regard to existing conditions or future growth
and development, is not a proper exercise of the police power and is
not sustainable. No general zoning plan, however, can be inaugurated
without incurring complaints of hardship in particular instances. But
the individual whose use of his property may be restricted is not the
only person to be considered. The great majority, whose enjoyment
of their property rights requires the imposition of restrictions upon the
uses to which private property may be put, must also be taken into con-
sideration. The exclusion of places of business from residential dis-
tricts is not a declaration that such places are nuisances or that they
are to be suppressed as such, but it is a part of the general plan by
which the city's territory is allotted to different uses in order to pre-
vent, or at least to reduce, the congestion, disorder and dangers which
often inhere in unregulated municipal development."' 9
Fire limit regulations have been in force in all the larger cities of
the country for many years. Such regulations are a simple form of
zoning, and when reasonable and uniform constantly approved by the
courts. Zoning insofar as it relates to the heights of buildings (assum-
ing ample grant of power), and also offensive occupations and indus-
tries which constitute a nuisance per se, or which are likely to become
such in their conduct, would be legal. Whether non-observance of an
established building line in the erection of a structure in a residence
district, for example, or the establishment of a store or shop in a dis-
trict set apart exclusively for residences, for another example, would
come within the prohibition of the police power would necessarily
depend upon the circumstances; that is to say, whether non-compliance
in either instance, under the facts of the case before the court for
decision, had any relation to the public safety, health, morals or general
welfare.
Some advocates of city zoning give forth expressions pointing to
the conclusion that the promotion of the public safety, health, morals
and general welfare depend alone, or mainly at least, on zoning.
Whether, for example, as concerns the future health of the city, the
most important part of city planning is the districting of the city into
zones, or whether such districting is the only practical method of pre-
venting the spread of contagion, would depend, of course, in the view
39. Aurora v. Burns, Ill. Sup. Ct., Dec. 16, 1925.
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of the law, on the existing conditions in the particular city to which
the zoning was sought to be applied. The facts in the particular case
presented to the court for decision would direct the judgment. It may
not be readily understood, for illustration, how the public health could
be affected to any extent by the establishment of building lines in
exclusively residential districts, or the exclusion from such districts
of the ordinary stores or shops that are conducted properly and which
are neither unwholesome nor offensive per se. But as to the latter con-
cerning safety, a different phase of the public welfare which the police
power might be brought into play to protect would be involved. 0
8. Public welfare.
The ancient Greek and the Roman seemed to see the purpose of
the state in the public welfare. The term, it must be conceded, is un-
certain and indefinite. When it is sought to be applied too broadly and
perhaps bears quite hard upon property owners they are inclined to
think, in the words of the great iconoclast Thomas Paine that "gov-
ernment even in its best state is but a necessary evil."
"In this day none will dispute that government in the exercise of
the police power may impose restrictions upon the use of property in
the interest of public health, morals and safety. That the same restric-
tions may be imposed upon the use of property in promotion of the
public welfare, convenience and general prosperity is perhaps not so
well understood, but nevertheless is firmly established by the decisions
of this and the federal Supreme Court."''4 Concerning the employ-
ment of the police power in the interest of public welfare, convenience
and community prosperity a few quotations from judicial opinions fol-
low. "The police power of a state embraces regulations designed to
promote the public convenience or the general prosperity. '4 2 It "ex-
tends to so dealing with the conditions which exist in the state as to
bring out of them the greatest welfare of the people."'43 Under this
power "the government regulates the conduct of its citizens one
towards another, and the manner in which each shall use his own
property when such regulation becomes necessary for the public
good. 41 4 It "is that inherent and plenary power in the state which
enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort and welfare of
40. See observations, Opinion of the Justices, 234 Mass. 597, 127 N. E.525.
41. State ex rel. v. Harper, 182 Wis. 148, 155, 196 N. W. 451.
42. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Drainage Comrs., 200 U. S. 561, 592, 26
Sup. Ct. 341.
43. Bacon v. Walker, 204 U. S. 311, 27 Sup. Ct. 289.
44. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113, 124.
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society.""' In the decided cases "the police power is held to include
all those regulations which promote the general interest and prosper-
ity of the public generally."" In a late California case it is said the
regulation of the development of a city under a comprehensive and
carefully considered zoning plan "tends to promote the general welfare
of a community." It is for the general welfare in the opinion of the
court whether the plan establishes exclusive residential districts,
"because it tends to promote and perpetuate the American home."
"The general welfare of a community is but the aggregate welfare of
its constituent members, and that which tends to promote the welfare
of the individual member of society cannot fail to benefit society as
a whole."' 7  "Circumstances may so change in time . as to
clothe with a public interest what at other times would be
a matter of purely private concern."'
8
Thus from the above, largely obiter dicta, that is, from the ex-
pression of opinion and assertions of the courts, it appears that under
circumstances of particular cases, public welfare includes public con-
venience. general prosperity, the greatest welfare of the public, all the
great public needs, "what is sanctioned by usage or held by the prevail-
ing morality or strong and preponderant opinion to be greatly and
immediately necessary,"' 9 what is required for the public good, sup-
pression of all things hurtful to the comfort and welfare of society,
and finally all regulations which promote the general interest and pros-
perity of the public.
In assertions and expression of opinions by judges concerning
the scope of the police powers, if read apart from the facts of the case
before the court, many irreconcilable statements appear, even by the
same judges in different cases, as is true to be sure, more or less, in
all departments of the law, but it is likely true that greater conflict
is found in recent years than formerly, especially where the regula-
tion, restriction or prohibition rests mainly or alone upon what we
term the public good, welfare or general interest. Zoning cases are
replete with these seeming inconsistent phrases. We can learn only
what was really decided of course by understanding the facts of the
particular case and the judgment given because the facts were thus
45. State ex rel. v. Burdge, 95 Wis. 390. 398. 70 N. W. 347.
46. Trading Stamp Cases, 166 Wis. 613. 625, 166 N. W. 54.
47. Miller v. Board of Public Works (Cal.), 234 Pac. 381, 383, 385, 387.
48. Block v. Hirsh, 256 U. S. 135, 41 Sup. Ct. 458, 65 L. Ed. 865, 16
A. L. R. 165.
49. Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U. S. 104, 111, 39 Sup. Ct. 299.
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and so. This is the source of the law rather than the expressions of
opinion.5°
"We doubt, but we do not here decide, that under our Constitution
the state under the police power has the right to pass regulations
purely to promote the public convenience or the general prosperity to
the disadvantage and detriment of the individual property holders."51
"It is not true that the public welfare is a justification for the taking
of private property for the general good. The broad language found
in the books must be considered always in view of the facts, and when
this is done the difficulty disappears." 2 What beyond the health, peace,
morals and safety of the community, "the general phrase-public wel-
fare-in its relation to the police power may include is to be deter-
mined from the decided cases in the light of each one's facts, and
when new facts arise from the processes of reason which the judicial
mind brings to bear on the question. 53  The Minnesota Supreme
Court once said that the words "comfort, convenience, welfare and
prosperity are somewhat speculative; they are not susceptible of pre-
cise definition." 54
Plainly, lessening congestion in the public streets and promoting
the public health and safety-the expressly declared purposes of zon-
ing laws-are fairly within the range of the police power. But whether
the regulations and restrictions contemplated by such laws unrelated
to a recognized subject of the police power would be advancing the
public welfare would depend wholly upon the particular facts of each
case when sought to be applied. Courts interpret the term public wel-
fare with some strictness. It does not include mere expediency, whim,
caprice, sentimental objects or purely aesthetic purposes, nor usually
mere convenience. So far as courts have given utterances expressive
of their attitude on these matters it is an open question to what extent
"public welfare," apart from a recognized basis justifying the exercise
of the police power, would embrace the character of the district, its
peculiar suitability for particular uses, the conservation of property
values and the direction of building development. In view of the pres-
ent state of the judicial decisions, every mariner, therefore, who enters
upon an unexplored portion of the unsafe and somewhat treacherous
sea of the police power frequently finds himself without sound rudder
.50. Note the cautionary remarks as to "public welfare," and like general
terms in Commonwealth v. Strauss, 191 Mass. 545, 78 N. E. 136; Wilming-
ton v. Turk (Del. Ch.), 129 Atl. 512, 515, 516.
51. Fitzhugh v. Jackson, 132 Miss. 585, 70 So. 190, 33 L. R. A. 279.
52. Ambler Realty Co. v. Euclid, 297 Fed. 307, 314.
53. Wilmington v. Turk (Del. Ch.), 129 Atl. 512, 516.
54. State v. Houghton, 124 Minn. 226.
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or certain compass. But in any event it is nevertheless true that there
must be an essential public need for the exercise of the police power
in order to justify its use."
If the zoning or any part thereof is to promote public safety,
health, order or morals, and is valid in other respects, it will be sus-
tained, or such parts thereof which are separable from void parts as
relates to these subjects; but if it relates alone to the public interest
or general welfgre, terms of uncertain import, the regulations will be
closely scrutinized by the courts, and the conditions inducing the regu-
lations must justify them, otherwise they will be pronounced void.
In recent times there is a disposition greater than ever before to
use the police power to secure objects strongly desired by the public
or an aggressive minority thereof. This attitude of mind restricts per-
sonal liberty and property rights and assumes that a public desire, when
strong and persistent, is the equivalent of a real, vital and compelling
public need. There is great danger involved in overlooking the consti-
tutional guarantees and neglecting to give them full force and effect
as designed. Indeed these guarantees, the result of years of struggle
and sacrifice, have been made the very heart of our governmental
process. Though the exercise of the police power in its very nature,
as the power to govern, includes an indefinite and indefinable element
of public welfare which the legislatures may in the first instance deter-
mine, subject to the adjudication of the courts, which have shown in
late years an increasing disposition to sustain, it must be remembered
that this essential power has its limitations.
Experience has demonstrated the wisdom of placing restrictions
upon "the use of the police power and eminent domain that those
charged with the conduct of public affairs may not in disregard of
the rights of the individual render the government despotic." "Con-
stitutional inhibitions must not be set aside or wiped out by every wave
of popular clamor. There is too much disposition to set aside and
ignore the organic law when there is a popular wave demanding such
course. It is for the courts to steady the ship of state and hold the
organic law intact."5 6
The police power necessarily "has its limits and must stop when
it encounters the prohibitions of the Constitution. A clash will not,
however, be lightly inferred. Governmental powers must be flexible
and adaptive. Exigencies arise, or even conditions less peremptory,
which may call for or suggest legislation, and it may be a struggle in
55. Youngstown v. Kahn Bros. Bldg. Co. (Ohio), 148 N. E. 842, 844.
56. State ex rel. v. McKelvey, 301 Mo. 1, 16, 38.
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judgment to decide whether it must yield to the higher considerations
expressed and determined by the provisions of the Constitution.
5 7
However, in no event can constitutional guaranties "be dissolved and
avoided by the application of the police power of the state."5 8
We should not suffer it to be used to destroy, little by little, the
organic safeguards of personal and property rights until they all dis-
appear. If we are not pleased with private ownership of property and
personal liberty as the foundation stones of our political system and
wish some other basis, we should frankly ask for a change by amend-
ment of our constitutions and not try to effect change by indirection
in invoking legislative infringements often brought about by propa-
ganda, but worst of all when the courts in adhering to their highest
judicial functions are compelled to hold many of these imperceptible
legislative encroachments contrary to the will and purpose of the peo-
ple, as plainly expressed in their organic laws, a campaign is started
at once to coerce, weaken or destroy the most vital organ of our gov-
ernment.
Many judgments of the United States Supreme Court, and many
in the state courts of last resort exist warning against the legislative
disposition, prompted by special interests, groups or classes, to extend
the police power so as to destroy private property and annihilate the
guaranties of the Constitution. 9
We must avoid the belief that under the police power "all private
property is held subject to the temporary and passing phases of public
opinion, dominant for a day, in legislative or municipal assemblies."00
Rather the admonition of Mr. Justice Holmes, speaking for the
Supreme Court of the United States, should be heeded. He says, "The
protection of private property in the fifth amendment presupposes that
it is wanted for public use, but provides that it shall not be taken for
such use without compensation. A similar assumption is made in
the decisions upon the fourteenth amendment. When this seemingly
absolute protection is found to be qualified by the police power, the
natural tendency of human nature is to extend the qualification more
57. Eubank v. Richmond, 226 U. S. 143. 33 Sup. Ct. 77, 57 L. Ed. 156, 42
L. R. A. (N. S.) 1123, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 192.
58. Goldman v. Crowther (Md.), 128 Atl. 50, 54, 55.
59. Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U. S. 525, 43 Sup. C1. 394, 67
L. Ed. 785, 24 A. L. R. 1238; Wolff Co. v. Industrial Court, 262 U. S. 522,
43 Sup. Ct. 630, 67 L. Ed. 1103, Eubank v. Richmond, 226 U. S. 137, 33 Sup.
Ct. 76, 57 L. Ed. 156, 42 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1123, Ann Cas. 1914B, 192; Bu-
chanan v. Warley, 245 U. S. 60, 38 Sup. Ct. 16, 62, L. Ed. 149, L. R. A.
1918C, 210, Ann. Cas. 1918A, 1201; Adams v. Tanner, 244 U. S. 590, 37 Sup.
Ct. 662, 61 L. Ed. 1336, L. R. A. 1917F, 1163, Ann. Cas. 1917D, 973.
60. Ambler Realty Co. v. Euclid, 297 Fed. 307, 314.
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and more until at last private property disappears. But that cannot be
accomplished in this way under the Constitution of the United States.
* * We are in danger of forgetting that a strong public desire to
improve the public condition is not strong enough to warrant achiev-
ing the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying
for the change." 61
It will be noted that such language and the implications therefrom
are quite different from expressions of the same Justice in an earlier
case, constantly quoted to justify the exercise of the police power
almost without limit.
62
Not only do our constitutions, federal and state, forbid the taking
of private property without just compensation, but the consensus of
opinion throughout the land cries out against such unfair, arbitrary,
oppressive action entirely out of harmony with the spirit of just
government.
The force of public opinion as to regulation and restriction of
property uses, to some extent at least, may be taken into account by
the courts. When it is sound, enlightened and persistent in a steady
and undeviating direction of a higher plane of concrete justice, com-
munity progress and civic betterment it is certain to influence modi-
fications of judicial views theretofore entertained of organic princi-
ples and guarantees. But we can scarcely say that constitutional pro-
visions are thereby changed. Rather in the precise language of the
Supreme Court of the United States, they "are extended in their
operation to new matters and conditions as the modes of business and
the habits of life of the people change each succeeding generation." 83
Thus although the precepts of our constitutional law are stated in
fixed terms their application varies with the growth of society. Accord-
ingly our constitutional law, as is true of all law, so often said, is con-
stantly in the making.
The courts are constantly developing the police power. They have
wide power of finding, interpreting and applying the law as fresh con-
ditions arise. They combine relative certainty in public regulation with
the capacity for growth. In dealing with the subject they have been
61. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U. S. 393, 415, 416, 43 Sup.
Ct. 158, 67 L. Ed. 322.
62. Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U. S. 104, 111, quoted above.
63. Debs Case, 158 U. S. 564, 591. "The judges are not conceived as making
new laws-they have no right or power to do that-rather they are but declaring
what has always been law." F. W. Maitland, The Constitutional History of
England, pp. 22, 23, speaking of the common law. "Judges ought to remember
that their office is jus dicere, not jus dare; to interpret law and not to make
law or give law." Bacon's Essay on Judicature.
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cautious, and to avoid restriction on its necessary and reasonable use
within the limits of organic law, as the exigencies and requirements
develop from time to time demanding restriction or prohibition they
have consistently refrained from attempting to circumscribe with accu-
racy an orbit within which such power may freely play. This has been
the position of the Supreme Court of the United States from the be-
ginning, yet that court, perhaps in a larger sense than other courts
has taken judicial cognizance of the everyday facts of modern complex
social and industrial life and has responded thereto with less apparent
reluctance than most of the courts of last resort of the several states.04
With an experience of a century and a third it is plain that our
written constitutions tend to stabilize as they were designed, our ad-
vancement, and do not unreasonably hinder, as many believe, adequate
regulation essential to a progressive people. Some feel that the courts
are too conservative in protecting private property and its use, but the
thoughtful and reflecting will incline to believe that it is better so
rather than to suffer municipal authorities, oftentimes superinduced
by unwise or interest propaganda, unreasonable zeal or inordinate
obsession to rush pell mell into unknown or unexplored domains of
regulation beyond the vision of the mental and moral standards of the
community without careful deliberation and due regard to tried and
sound organic provisions which in the main approximate the epitome
of human experience. Nor should we suffer our course and rate of
progress to be dominated by the swiftly changing passions of the hour
reckless of such experience. The genuine progressive and forward
looking must have the mental vision to see the Star of Hope not only
but as well the safe road that leads thereto. He should seek to antici-
pate pitfalls ahead, as men have or have not done before. A knowl-
edge of the fate of mankind on the same old road will tend to steady
his steps and keep his feet on firm ground.
9. Aesthetic purposes.
Some cases appear to support the conclusion that aesthetic con-
siderations alone justify the exertion of the police power."' Others
regard it legitimate to take them into account but deny that they can
furnish the real basis for the exercise of police power.00 Undoubt-
64. Goodnow, Social Reform and the Constitution, 325 et seq.; Wil-
liams, The Law of City Planning and Zoning, 25.
65. Ware v. Wichita, 113 Kan. 153, 214 Pac. 99; State ex rel. v. Hough-
ton, 144 Minn. 1, 13, 174 N. W. 885, 176 N. W. 159.
66. St. Louis Poster Adv. Co. v. St. Louis, 249 U. S. 269, 39 Sup. Ct. 274;
Welch v. Sweasey, 214 U. S. 91, 29 Sup. Ct. 567, 193 Mass. 364, 79 N. E.
745; Opinion of the Justices, 234 Mass. 597, 127 N. E. 525.
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edly the law has undergone a decided change in this respect in recent
years. 7 However, so far as it appears from judicial judgments, apart
from general expressions on the subject, restrictions on the use of
property contained in zoning regulations solely for purely aesthetic
purposes are regarded as invasions of private property rights.
In construing the basis for the exercise of the power in zoning
under the Massachusetts statutes, namely, that it "will tend to improve
and beautify the city or town" and "will harmonize with its natural
development," the court observed: "Enhancement of the artistic attrac-
tiveness of a city or town can be considered in exercising the powers
conferred by the proposed act only when the dominant aim in respect
to the establishment of districts based on use and construction of build-
ings has primary regard to other factors lawfully within the scope of
the police power; and then it can be considered, not as the main pur-
pose to be attained, but only as subservient to another or other main
ends recognized as sufficient under amendment sixty (constitutional),
and the general principles governing the exercise of the police
power."'
In the necessary and desirable exercise of the police power, espe-
cially during the past two decades, its expanding capacity and pro-
ductive energy is everywhere in evidence in municipal regulation and
restriction, and as a consequence we cannot fail to observe the con-
stantly changing attitude of the court relating thereto. But notwith-
standing its vigorous development and I may say its present gigantic
proportions it has not reached the point of including within its com-
pass in promoting the public welfare, even in the broadest sense, purely
artistic and aesthetic purpose. Until this goal is attained unsightly
structures will continue to offend the eye without municipal means
of suppression. If, however, the restrictions rest upon the substantial
ground of a reasonable police regulation, as height of building or bill-
board limitations, the fact that they have artistic and aesthetic pur-
poses in view will not invalid them. These are matters, as the courts
have frequently recognized, of public and governmental concern, yet
standing alone in the light of the present development of this branch
of the law they are not sufficient to support unreasonable or doubtful
restrictions concerning the lawful use of private property, nor will
they standing alone sanction the taking or injuring of such property,
in the language of federal and state constitutions, without "due process
67. Civello v. New Orleans, 154 La. 271, 284, 97 So. 440; Chandler,
"Attitude of the Law Toward Beauty," American Bar Assn. Journal, Vol.
8, p. 470.
68. Opinion of the Justices, 234 Mass. 597, 605, 127 N. E. 525.
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of law," or in denying the owner thereof the "equal protection of the
law." As put by the courts the distinction is between matters of lux-
ury and indulgence and necessity, the latter being regarded at present
as the sole motive for the exertion of the power to govern.
It is a matter of general information that much municipal legisla-
tion and regulation of late years have been induced largely by these
considerations and this desire to render the cities and towns more
attractive and beautiful has found a firm lodgment in the popular mind.
It is destined to increase with the years, and in the growth of the law
in this respect courts will be inclined to give a broader interpretation
of these objects, and I have no doubt finally sanction restrictions im-
posed solely to advance material attractiveness and artistic beauty.
Nevertheless, perhaps I may predict that in the present development
of the law relating to this subject courts in adhering to their legalistic
method of thinking-a method at once safe and sane constituting a
wholesome restraint on rash and radical legislative and administrative
action-are certain to be slow in sustaining police regulations as consti-
tutionally valid which seem to deprive the owners of property of what
are now regarded as its lawful uses because of a supposed public ad-
vantage which at present rests largely alone on the sentiment of a
particular class due to superior cultivation. For some time until this
class increases in number to such an extent as to create a healthy, ma-
ture community opinion that such restrictions are necessary or de-
sirable to advance the public welfare, courts will be disposed to say,
as they have so often said in the past, "Before this can be done there
must be compensation first made." But to what extent public art,
aesthetic matters, architectural harmony and beauty alone should enter
into the consideration of the public welfare as a ground for exten-
sion of governmental powers to regulate or restrict property uses is a
problem as yet unsolved. On this subject there is written expression
in full, heaped and rounded measure, and obiter dicta in abundance,
but no authoritative judicial judgments announcing a formula applica-
ble to all cases as they arise.
On this subject in a recent zoning case the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin observed, "It seems to us that aesthetic considerations are
relative in their nature. With the passing of time, social standards
conform to new ideals. As a race, our sensibilities are becoming more
refined, and that which formerly did not offend cannot now be endured.
That which the common law did not condemn as a nuisance is now
frequently outlawed as such by the written law. That is not because
the subject outlawed is of a different nature, but because our sensibili-
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ties have become more refined and our ideals more exacting. Nauseous
smells have always come under the ban of the law, but ugly sights and
discordant surroundings may be just as distressing to keener sensi-
bilities. The rights of property should not be sacrificed to the pleasure
of an ultra-aesthetic taste. But whether they should be permitted to
plague the average or dominant human sensibilities well may we
ponder.""
In a late zoning case the Missouri court aptly said that while the
reasoning of the courts "recognizes the aesthetic their rulings follow-
ing the principles which had their origin in the common law concern-
ing individual and property rights, are definitely utilitarian. ' 70 And
in the latest Ohio zoning case this language appears: "It is commenda-
ble and desirable, but not essential to the public need, that our aesthetic
desires be gratified." The police power is based upon public necessity,
and hence "public health, morals or safety, and not merely aesthetic
interest, must be in danger in order to justify its use." 7'
10. Property values.
While the protection of property values may be a concern of gov-
ernment so far it has never been expressly decided by the courts that
it is a proper subject of the police power standing alone, aside from
public health, safety, morals, or what has been compendiously declared
by the courts to be the public welfare. To support legislation designed
to protect property values, therefore, it would be necessary to include
this subject within the other economic subjects already recognized by
the courts. To what extent the courts will take into account the pro-
tection of property values as a subject of the police power, in view of
the present development of the law, may not be determined readily.
However, numerous expressions abound in court opinions to the effect
that in particular situations and conditions in the exercise of the police
power to advance the general interest, courts will incline to give at
least a nod of recognition to the safeguarding of property values.
Quite recently the Supreme Court of Louisiana remarked that courts
recognize the fact of common knowledge that property brings a bet-
ter price in a residence neighborhood where business establishments
are excluded than in such locality where an objectionable business is
apt to be established at any time, and hence an exclusive residence dis-
trict sustains in a general way the value of neighborhood property.
The court expressed the opinion that this is as much a matter of gen-
69. Owen J. State ex rel. v. Harper, 182 Wis. 148, 159, 196 N. W. 451.
70. State ex rel. v. McKelvey, 301 Mo. 1, 19.
71. Youngstown v. Kahn Bros. Bldg. Co. (Ohio), 148 N. E. 842, 844.
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eral welfare as is any other condition that fosters comfort or happi-
ness, and consequent values generally of the property in the locality.
12
Some two years ago the Utah Supreme Court put forth like ex-
pressions.73
As to flats and apartment buildings in exclusive or restrict-
ed residence streets or districts, which laws seek to forbid, it may be
said that such structures are a decided detriment to dwellers in their
immediate vicinity. Among other inconveniencs, it is a matter of com-
mon knowledge, whether or not courts will take judicial notice thereof,
that such structures tend in some degree at least to interfere with the
light and air of residences in the immediate neighborhood, increase to
some extent the fire hazard, and destroy the privacy and quietude of the
street oi district by the frequent deliveries of articles and by the
number of persons going in and out of the apartments. Moreover,
as to some such structures it is likely true that the danger of the spread
of infectious diseases may be increased. The disadvantages arising
from one apartment house in an exclusive residence neighborhood,
although considerable, would be greatly augmented by the multipli-
cation of such structures in the locality. Common experience proves
that the first flats or apartments usually drive out the single resi-
dences adjacent thereto, and thus make space for and encourage the
erection of more apartments, so ultimately the desirability of the
locality as a residence section is destroyed, and as a direct consequence,
the residences built at great cost depreciate in value. Other exclu-
sive residence districts that may be created may suffer like fate.
As to the exercise of the police power to protect property values,
it should be said that most of the state courts are adverse to excluding
all business from residence districts, but the United States Supreme
Court has not passed directly upon the question. As applied to one or
two or a few only of property interests it is not likely that it would
appeal strongly to the courts. If, however, there was involved in the
record before the court a comprehensive zoning plan, well matured,
reasonable in all respects, showing upon its face that it was designed
to promote that part of the public welfare represented by the property
owners of the particular district, and would in fact stabilize values
and prevent the destruction of property rights resulting from action
on the part of those unmindful of the general interest in making use
of their property; and, moreover, if the plan also showed that by
excluding business of all kinds from the district proper locations for
72. State v. New Orleans, 154 La. 271, 97 So. 440, 33 A. L. R. 260.
73. Salt Lake City v. Western Foundry Stove Repair Works, 55 Utah
AAs'
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such businesses had been maturely worked out and designated, and
that no loss could possibly result to those excluded therefrom, there
would be some chance that it would receive the favorable consideration
of the courts. In such case those things likely to occur in the ordinary
course of events could be taken into account by the court, and, with
such a plan, it would clearly appear that benefit would accrue to all of
the residents of the district; that is to say, the welfare of the public,
or a large part thereof, would be advanced, in that their comfort, con-
venience and economic welfare, and even safety, especially of the old
and young, in being free from dangers more or less apparent incident
to the conduct of many kinds of enterprises, even stores and shops,
would be promoted thereby, without undue interference with the prop-
erty or personal rights of those excluded therefrom.
11. Present status of court judgments.
Zoning ordinances involve new and perplexing questions relating
to the police power constantly expanding in its application to the rapid
development of urban centers, and it is not at all strange to find court
opinions upon them quite divergent. Some judges declare in a general
way that under the usual protection of property rights found in state
constitutions the state cannot grant power to its cities to zone under
the police power, without compensation for property damaged by use
restrictions. On the other hand, some courts go so far as to say that
"so thoroughly has the value of zoning been demonstrated that no
longer is the constitutionality of the principle open to question," that
"the police power as evidenced in zoning ordinances has a much wider
scope than the mere suppression of the offensive use of property, and
that it acts not only negatively, but constructively and affirmatively,
for the promotion of the public welfare.""4 "Zoning statutes are be-
coming common. . . A restriction, which years ago would have
been intolerable, and would have been thought an unconstitutional re-
strction of the owner's use of his property, is accepted now without a
thought that ti invades a private right. As social relations become
more complex, restrictions on individual rights become more common.
With the crowding of population in the cities, there is an active insis-
tence upon the establishment of residential districts from which annoy-
ing occupations, and buildings undesirable to the community, are ex-
cluded. . . The trend of authorities is in the way of sustaining leg-
islative regulations. . . Zoning ordinances, fair in their require-
ments, are generally sustained.17 5
74. Miller v. Board of Public Works (Cal.), 234 Pac. 381, 384.
75. State v. Houghton (Minn.), 204 N. W. 569, 570.
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Various phases of restrictive measures and the characteristics
of zoning regulations have been considered and decided by courts of
last resort of several states with varying conclusions."6 Though the
Supreme Court of the United States so far has had no occasion to pass
upon the constitutional validity of city and town zoning, comprehen-
sive or limited, except as to building regulations, height of structures
and so forth and detrimental uses of property, nuisances and things
hurtful to health, safety, morals and welfare, it appears that decisions
of the courts of last resort in California, Illinois, Kansas, Louisiana,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, New York, Ohio Utah and Wisconsin have
sustained as constitutionally valid restrictions on the use of real estate
in specific instances contained in zoning statutes and ordinances based
upon ample grant of power, applicable to all parts of the municipal
area or to portions thereof only, where found from the record of the
case presented for judgment to have been reasonably exercised. 7
Other states, namely, Colorado, Delaware, Maryland,7 Michigan,
Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey,70 Texas 8° and West
Virginia, seem either to be against or leave the question in doubt.
In Delaware a comprehensive zoning ordinance of Wilmington,
authorized by ample statutory power, by its terms excluded hospitals
from residential districts established. The hospital sought to be ex-
cluded was a private one to be maintained in a private residence. The
chancellor put the question: "Is the ordinance as applied to defendant
a constitutional exercise of authority? If valid it must rest upon the
police power of the state for its support." The court found that the
hospital was not a nuisance and in no wise offensive, that it "is of
such kind and character and is so conducted as not in the least manner
to be an offense or annoyance of any kind to anyone." Finally, the
76. Byrne v. Maryland Realty Co., 129 Md. 202, 98 Atl. 547, L. R. A.
1917A, 1216; Willison v. Cooke, 54 Colo. 320, 130 Pac. 828, 44 L. R. A.
(N. S.), 1030; Wineburgh Advertising Co. v. Murphy, 195 N. Y. 126, 88
N. E. 17, 21 L. R. A. (N. S.) 735; Windsor v. Whitney, 95 Conn. 357, 111
Atl. 354, 12 A. L. R. 669.
77. Lihcoln Trust Co. v. Williams Bldg. Corp., 229 N. Y. 313, 317, 128
N. E. 209; Holzbauer v. Ritter, 184 Wis. 35, 198 N. W. 852; Spector v.
Milton Building Inspector (Mass.), 645 N. E. 265; Brett v. Building Coner.(Mass.), 145 N. .. 269; Building Inspector v. Stoklosa (Mass.), 145 N. E. 262.
78. Byrne v. Maryland Realty Co., 129 Md. 202, 98 Atl. 547, L. R. A.
1917A, 1216; Goldman v. Crowther (Md.), 128 AtI. 50, with court opinion
and dissenting opinion, fully reviewing zoning cases.
79. Handy v. South Orange, 99 N. J. Law, 118 Atl. 838; Vernon v. West-
field (N. J. Sup.), 124; Cliffside Park v. Cliffside, 96 N. J. Law 278, 114
At. 797.
Statute authorizing towns to enact zoning ordinances, held constitu-
tional. Schait v. Senior, 97 N. J. Law 390, 117 Ati. 517.
80. Spann v. Dallas, 111 Tex. 350, 235 S. W. 513, 19 A. L. R. 1387.
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court denied that the right of private property could be "taken away
when the circumstances of its use are inoffensive and of injury to no
one," and refused to exclude the private hospital from the residential
district. 81
In Maryland a comprehensive zoning ordinance excluding in terms
all business from a residential district was adjudged unconstitutional
and void. In the case before the court the effect of the restriction was
to prevent the use of a basement of a four-story dwelling for the
repair of used clothing in a residential district which was denied.
82
In a Michigan case, which involved a zoning ordinance of De-
troit, the city had no power granted it to zone. The court said: "No
such inherent zoning power exists or can be implied in this state from
the mere incorporation of a city as such. . . . To whatever extent
this proposed zoning system may be desirable and might prove feasible,
power to enforce it is not a necessary power yet recognized as essential
to local government." In the particular case mandamus to compel
the issuance of a permit to construct an automobile battery service
station in which it was proposed to keep, sell and repair automobile
storage batteries in a residential district or zone was sustained.88
In a Mississippi case a comprehensive ordinance of Jackson sought
to exclude from residential districts or zones all business enterprises
of every character unless the residents and property owners within a
certain area of the place where the proposed business would be con-
ducted should petition or consent thereto in writing. All "structures
whatsoever for business enterprises, even though the same might be
in part used for residential purposes," were excluded. The complain-
ant desired to erect a building and conduct a retail grocery store in
the district. The court concluded that "such a sweeping ordinance
is not a valid exercise of the police power of the municipality,"
and is in violation of the state constitution. One using property "for
the purpose of conducting a retail grocery store in a lawful manner,"
said the court, "does not injure, in the legal sense, the property of his
neighbor." Regarding the police power in the broadest sense, the
court expressed the opinion that the ordinance could not be said "to
81. Wilmington v. Turk (Del. Ch.), 129 Atl. 512, reviewing and com-
menting on numerous decisions.
Other hospital cases are: Hall v. House of St. Giles, The Cripple, 154
N. Y. Supp. 96, affirmed 158 N. Y. Supp. 1117; Lawrence v. Nissen, 173 N. C.
359; Cook v. Fall River, 239 Mass. 90, 93. 94; Everett v. Pashall, 61 Wash.
47; Cherry v. Williams, 147 N. C. 452.
82. Goldman v. Crowther (Md.), 128 Ati. 50, 33 A. L. R. 1455, with
one Judge dissenting.
83. Clements v. McCabe, 210 Mich. 207, 177 N. W. 722.
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promote the public convenience or the general prosperity of the munici-
pality or its inhabitants." On the other hand, the "ordinance is an
arbitrary interference with the individual use of private property by
the owner thereof."84
In Nebraska, under a statute empowering cities of the metropoli-
tan class to divide thie city into districts and imposing regulations,
usual in zoning, by ordinance "designed to secure the safety from fire
and other dangers, and to promote the public health and welfare, in-
cluding, so far as conditions -may permit, provisions for adequate light,
air and convenience of access," it was held that a comprehensive zoning
ordinance of Omaha dividing the city into five classes of area districts,
imposing a restriction upon the owners of property with respect to the
area of such real estate that may be covered by a proposed building,
namely, to twenty-five per cent of the surface of the lots in the zone
or district involved, was unreasonable. In the particular case the
property owner sought a permit to occupy 37Y2 per cent of the area of
the lots in question, which were in a residential district, and the court
sustained the granting of a mandamus to issue the permit. The court
said that the ordinance went "beyond the scope of authority conferred
by the legislature. That part of the ordinance which confines the build-
ing area to 25 per cent of the lot is so restrictive that it is an unreason-
able exercise of the power granted by the legislature, and for that
reason that part of the ordinance must be held to be invalid."85
In West Virginia, a zoning ordinance of Bluefield excluded from
a designated residence district all business without consent of a named
percentage of property owners. It was held that the ordinance "con-
stitutes an unreasonable and discriminatory exercise of the police
power and is therefore unconstitutional and void."8
There are two recent Missouri cases which arose under the St.
Louis comprehensive zoning ordinance. St. Louis has a so-called home
rule charter, authorized by the state constitution, drafted by a board
of freeholders and approved by the electors. It invested itself with
broad police powers but no specific power to zone. It has wide power
to define and prohibit, abate, suppress and prevent or license and regu-
84. Fitzhugh v. Jackson, 132 Miss. 585, 601, 602, 605, 609, 611, 97 So. 90,
33 A. L. R. 279, approving Quintini v. Bay St. Louis, 64 Miss. 483, 1 So. 625,
60 Am. Rep. 62.
85. State v. Edgecomb, 108 Neb. 859, 189 N. W. 617, 27 L. R. A. 437.
A dissenting opinion was flied in which the dissenting Judge expressed
the opinion that the ordinance "had its origin in an exalted conception of
civic life," that the goal "was public improvement, leading to better, health-
ier, more comfortable and happier conditions." P. 865.
86. Austin v. Thomas, 96 W. Va. 628, 637, 123 S. E. 590, 38 A. L. R. 1490.
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late all acts, practices, conduct, business, occupations, callings, trades,
uses of property, and all other things whatsoever detrimental or liable
to be detrimental to the health, morals, comfort, safety, convenience or
welfare of the inhabitants, and also nuisances and the causes thereof.
Also power to prescribe limits within which business, occupations and
practices liable to be nuisances or detrimental to the health, morals,
security or general welfare may lawfully be established, conducted or
maintained.
The ordinance divided the area of the city into five classes of
districts or zones, extending over the entire municipal territory, name-
ly, first residence, second residence, commercial, industrial and un-
restricted. The ordinance by its terms excluded a definite business-a
building in which to install and conduct an electrically driven ice man-
ufactory-from the district or zone involved, namely. a second resi-
dence.
The question as stated by the court is, "is the ordinance valid in
that it constitutes such an exercise of the police power as will sustain
the limitation therein prescribed in regard to the use of private prop-
erty by the owner of the same? It is pertinent, although perhaps element-
ary, to say that the power here sought to be exercised by the city is to
regulate the mode of living of the inhabitants, and thus, viewed from
a sociological vantage, to provide for their health, comfort and wel-
fare." In passing on the power contained in the charter the court said:
"Certainly no more can be meant from the terms employed in the pro-
hibition and suppression of certain callings than those which detri-
mentally affect the material welfare of the people (as distinguished
from aesthetic considerations): and the limiting of certain occupa-
tions and callings to a prescribed territory must in reason be subjected
to a like interpretation.If this be true, and these charter provisions lend
no other reasonable coloring to the conclusion as to their meaning,
then this ordinance, the avowed purpose of which is simply an arbi-
trary exclusion of a definite business from a prescribed district, is in
excess of the power with which the city saw fit to invest itself when
it framed its organic law."
After approving an Illinois case, denying the right of a city under
the police power to prohibit the establishment of a retail store in
a residential district because as urged it would be detrimental to the
public health, morals, comfort and general welfare,8 7 the court said:
87. People v. Chicago, 261 Ill. 16.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol11/iss2/2
ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
"An ice manufactory, electrically conducted, in the absence of any
objectionable feature connected with its operation, is certainly no more
subject to prohibition or restriction than a retail store."883
A concurring opinion recites: "The value of property is dependent
upon the uses to which it may be put. To limit the use is a restriction
upon the right of property, and should not be made without compen-
sation, unless the right restricted would, if exercised, rise to the plane
of a public nuisance. The ordinance here goes much farther. It re-
stricts the use of property (a vested property right) without reference
to the deleteriousness or harmfulness of the uses eliminated by the
terms of the ordinance, and this without compensation or even inquiry
as to the damages that might be done." 89
On rehearing the court said that the ordinance "provides for the
taking of private property for a public use without compensation and
without a judicial hearing. It is not a regulation which falls within
the reasonable exercise of the police power. It is a confiscation, pure
and simple." 0
It thus appears that it was not the lack of charter power but the
protection of property rights by the constitutions, state and federal,
which invalidates the ordinance.91
The ordinance, in the other Missouri case, prohibiting the erection
or use of private property for the storage of scrap iron, rags and junk
in an industrial district, but permitting its use for such purposes in
an unrestricted district, was held void. The court reasoned: "It is
clear that the exercise of the police power in reference to private occu-
pations is limited to such regulations as may be reasonably necessary
for the protection of the peace, health and comfort of society. Livery
stables, dairies, laundries, soap and glue factories, in short, all trades
and occupations prejudicial to the health, morals and good government
of the citizens may be restricted. But in all cases whether the business
or occupation is a nuisance or not is a question of fact." The opinion
denied the validity of regulations based upon aesthetic considerations.
The ordinance as sought to be applied was held "unreasonable and
oppressive, that it imposed restrictions upon the use of private property
that have no relation to the health, safety, comfort or welfare of the
inhabitants of the city, that it is an unlawful deprivation of the use of
defendants' property without compensation or due process of law, a
88. State ex rel. v. McKelvey, 301 Mo. 1, 15, 17, 19, 20, 256 S. W. 474.
89. Ibid, pp. 22, 23.
90. Ibid, p. 41.
91. One Judge filed two dissenting opinions, one at the original hear-
ing and one at the rehearing. Ibid, pp. 24-36, 41-49.
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denial of the enjoyment of the gains of their own industry, and that
the enactment of the ordinance is not within the powers delegated to
the city."'9
2
A late decision of a United States District Court dealt with a
tract of 68 acres of unimproved and unallotted land in the village of
Euclid, lying a short distance east of the easterly limits of the city of
Cleveland. The ordinance restricted the present and future use of the
land, part of which fronting on a named avenue to a depth of 150
feet was restricted to a single-family dwelling, the next 470 in the rear
thereof was restricted to two-family dwellings, the next farther in
the rear might be used only for apartment dwellings, excluding any
form of trade or industry, and the remainder might be used for indus-
trial and manufacturing purposes. In addition there were restrictions
as to the height of any and all kinds of buildings, as to the lot area
which might be built on and which must be left free, and as to set-
back distances from street and lot lines. The land of the entire village
of Euclid, comprising nearly sixteen square miles and at present
largely farm land was in like manner restricted to six different classes
of uses. The court found from the evidence that "the normal and rea-
sonably to be expected use and development of plaintiff's land along
Euclid avenue is for general trade and commercial purposes, particu-
larly retail stores and like mercantile establishments; and that the nor-
mal and reasonably to be expected use of the residue, including the
restricted area, is for industrial and trade purposes." The court also
found that the restrictive provisions of the ordinance "impairs the
salability of the land and depresses its market value to the extent of
several hundred thousand dollars," and further, that if the restriction
should be sustained it would "prevent the normal and reasonably to be
expected increased value due to the availability of the land for trade,
industrial and commercial purposes."
Notwithstanding the village, as the court found, had all the police
power that the state legislature could confer (which, it should be said,
was as broad as any city or town does or can have), the ordinance
was held to be in violation of both the United States and state consti-
tutions, in that it deprived the land owner of his property "without
due process of law." The court remarked, "it can be sustained, if at
all, only as an exercise of the power of eminent domain and on condi-
tion of making just compensation." "It takes the plaintiff's property,
if not for private, at least for public use without just compensation."
92. St. Louis v. Evraff, 301 Mo. 231.
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In no just sense is it a "reasonable or legitimate exercise of the police
power." 9
3
Lately the Supreme Court of California, under ample grant of
power by the state, sustained a municipal ordinance enacted pursuant
to a general comprehensive zoning plan, based upon considerations of
public health, safety, morals and the general welfare, which it was
found would be applied fairly and impartially, regulating, restricting
and segregating the location of industries, the several classes of busi-
ness, trades or callings and the location of apartments or tenement
houses, clubhouses, group residences, two-family dwellings, and the
several classes of public and semi-public buildings. Municipalities of
California have power granted by fundamental law and by a legisla-
tive enabling act to create districts or zones, etc. The ordinance, a
comprehensive zoning plan of the city of Los Angeles, permitted in
the district or zone involved the erection, alteration, etc., of two-
family dwellings only. whereas the land owner desired to erect a four-
family flat dwelling. The court said, "The sole question presented is
whether or not the ordinance in controversy is a rightful exercise of
the police power conferred upon municipalities." It was sustained as
constitutional and within the police power.9 4
Recently the Illinois Supreme Court sustained as constitutional a
comprehensive zoning ordinance of Aurora passed by virtue of a
statutory grant of power. Under such ordinance the exclusion of a
grocery store in an established residential district was sanctioned. 5
In Kansas a comprehensive zoning ordinance may exclude store
buildings' and apartment houses from a residential district.9 7
In Louisiana power to zone has been granted by constitution and
statute to certain cities, including New Orleans, and the highest court
of that state has held that the statute does not deprive citizens of prop-
erty without due process of law, take property for public use without
just compensation, or deny equal protection of the laws within the
meaning of the state or United States constitutions, since, in the opin-
ion of the court, the provisions affect alike all persons similarly sit-
uated.98
93. Ambler Realty Co. v. Euclid, 297 Fed. 307. 309, 310, 312, 317, January
14, 1924. Northern District of Ohio. Eastern Division.
94. Miller v. Board of Public Works (Cal.), 234 Pac. 381; Zahn v. Board
of Public V.orks (Cal.), 234 Pac. 388, 391.
95. Aurora v. Burns, Illinois Sup. Ct., Dec. 16, 1925.
96. Ware v. Wichita. 113 Kan. 153. 214 Pac. 99.
97. West v. Wichita, 118 Kan. 265, 234 Pac. 978.
98. State ex rel. Civello v. New Orleans, 154 La. 271, 97 So. 440, 33
A. L. R. 260.
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In the first Massachusetts opinion on the subject of zoning it
should be observed that it was merely an opinion to the state legisla-
ture as to the validity of a proposed grant of power to certain classes
of cities to zone by virtue of constitutional authorization, which, in view
of a favorable opinion, was subsequently conferred. The court opin-
ion said: "It is easy to imagine ordinances enacted under the assumed
authority of the proposed act which would exceed the constitutional
limits of the police power and be an indefensible invasion of private
rights." 9
Recently the Minnesota court, reversing its former position, held
constitutional a comprehensive zoning ordinance of Minneapolis,
authorized by statute, which excluded from a designated restricted
residential district a four-family flat building which a property owner
sought to erect therein.?°
The Ohio decisions were conflicting, especially in the subordi-
nate courts,10' until lately the Supreme Court sustained the constitu-
tional validity of a comprehensive zoning ordinance of Cincinnati.1 0 2
But a provision in a zoning ordinance which related only to a certain
small district of the city of Youngstown-a so-called block ordinance
-- creating a residential district and excluding therefrom all buildings
to be used for dwellings, except as a single or two-family dwelling,
this court on the same day held unconstitutional, and an apartment
house was permitted to be erected therein. The court found nothing
in the record of the case "to indicate that the health, safety or morals
of the district or of the city will be impaired by the building of this
apartment house unless it be conceded that an apartment house is a
nuisance per se," which the court denied. The ordinance was held bad
because it had no reasonable relation to the public health, morals or
safety. The ordinance was treated as "a case of a use restriction pure
and simple."'1'
The Milwaukee ordinance established four classes of use districts
designated residence, local business, commercial and light manufactur-
99. Opinion of the Justices, 234 Mass 597, 127 N. E. 525.
100. State ex rel. Seery v. Houghton (Minn., July 3, 1925), 204 N. W.
569, following State v. Houghton, 144 Minn. 1, 13, 174 N. W. 885, 176 N. W.
159, 8 A. L. R. 585, but opposed to the result in State v. Minneapolis, 136
Minn. 479. 162 N. W. 477.
101. See Pontiac Co. v. Commissioners, 104 Ohio St. 447, 135 N. W. 635,
23 A. L. R. 866; Lucas v. State, 21 Ohio Law Reporter, 363 (holding a zoning
ordinance invalid); State ex rel. v. East Cleveland, 22 Ohio N. P. (N. S.)
549, holding zoning ordinance valid.
102. Pritz v. Messer, - (Ohio) -, 149 N. E. 30.
103. Youngstown v. Kahn Bros. Bldg. Co. (Ohio), 148 N. E. 842,
844-846.
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ing and industrial. Complainant's property was in a residence district.
He conducted a dairy and milk pasteurizing plant and sought to en-
large it as his business required by erecting an addition to the present
building. He asked for a permit, which was denied because in viola-
tion of the zoning ordinance, in that the building to be erected was in
a residence district. The ordinance emanating from ample grant of
power to the city was sustained as a proper exercise of the police
power as applied to the facts of the particular case before the court.
Tested by fundamental principles relating to the exercise of the
police power within the limits of the organic laws, the court considered
the constitutional validity of the particular zoning regulations by
answer to the inquiry, whether the regulations have any reasonable
tendency to promote the public morals, health or safety, or the public
comfort, welfare or prosperity.104
104. State ex rel. v. Harper, 182 Wis. 149, 196 N. W. 451, 455.
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